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Abstract
We study an asymmetric triopoly in a heterogeneous product market
where quantity decisions are delegated to managers. The two biggest rms are
commonly owned by shareholders such as index funds while the smallest rm
is owned by independent shareholders. Under such a common holding owner
structure, the owners have an incentive to coordinate when designing their
manager compensation schemes. This coordination leads to a reallocation
of production and induces a redistribution of prots. The trade volume in
the market is reduced so that shareholder coordination is detrimental to
consumer surplus as well as welfare.
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1 Introduction
The owners of big rms usually have to hire managers in order to run the
business. Managers, however, have their own interests and choose decisi-
ons depending on the incentives given by the compensation contracts. This
unavoidably implies that the compensation schemes oered by the owners
strategically inuence the operational decisions of their managers and hence
the prots of the rms. In the theory of Industrial Organization, these stra-
tegic eects are derived by applying models of two-stage games where owners
simultaneously oer performance-related compensation contracts in the rst
stage and managers simultaneously decide on prices or quantities in the se-
cond stage.
Vickers (1985), Sklivas (1987) and Fershtman and Judd (1987, 2006) have
been the rst to analyze the consequences of strategic manager compensati-
on in homogeneous markets. They assumed that the compensation contracts
consist of xed salaries and performance-dependent payments related to rm
prots on the one hand and revenues (or equivalently sales) on the other hand.
The managers maximize the performance-dependent payments by choosing
optimal quantities. The main result of these models is that, due to the strate-
gic eects, the incentives of the managers are biased: they decide to produce
more than the rm owners would if no managers were involved.
This basic framework has been extended in several dimensions. First,
other possible compensation contracts have been considered where revenues
are replaced by market shares (see, e.g., Jansen et al. 2007, Kopel and Lam-
bertini 2013, and Ritz 2008) or by relative prots (see, e.g., Salas Fumas 1992,
Aggarwal and Samwick 1999, Chirco et al. 2011, and Miller and Pazgal 2001
and 2002). For the duopoly case, a comparison of the dierent compensation
contracts has been provided by Jansen et al. (2009, 2012). Second, mixed
markets have been studied where some rms are governed by managers whi-
le others are run by the owners themselves (see, e.g., Basu 1995 and Tseng
2001). Third, Spagnolo (2000) has considered a supergame with innitely re-
peated competition to analyze dynamic compensation schemes based on the
shareholder values of the rms.
This paper aims to concentrate on the role of common large shareholders
such as mutual or index funds which coordinate the design of their manager
compensation schemes.1 Fund companies such as Blackrock, Vanguard, or
1We refer to 'common holdings' if some shareholders, e.g. index funds, are invested
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CalPERS certainly hold shares of multiple rms competing in a relevant
product market. A forteriori, index funds duplicate the entire stock market as
represented by major stock indices like the S&P500, Nikkei, or DAX. Because
of their common business model, even funds of dierent fund companies
are invested in the same sample of rms. The obvious consequence of such
a common holding is that the shareholders involved coordinate the design
of the compensation contracts for the managers of the rms in which they
are invested. Index funds experience a fast growing popularity. According
to Bogle (2016, 9), they have accounted for 160% of net cash ows into
equity mutual funds. Due to the increasing importance of mutual funds,
most notably index funds, our topic is high on the research agenda.
Regardless of the role of institutional investors, and without referring to
managerial incentives, the relevance of coordinated behavior in case of com-
mon and cross holdings has been intensively discussed in another strand of
the literature. Reynolds and Snapp (1986) and Breshnahan and Salop (1986)
have identied the incentives to mitigate competition in case of cross hol-
dings. Some models deal with the eects of common ownership in innitely
repeated games. Common ownerships interact with general incentives to col-
lude. According to Gilo et al. (2006), the stability of collusion subtly depends
on the dierent amounts of cross holdings within an industry. An increase
in cross holdings, however, always increases the stability of collusion. Addi-
tionally, they investigate the role of a controller who internalizes the interest
of minority shareholders (not participating in the cross holdings). Given this
controller, the stability of collusion may diminish in case of an increased
cross holding. The latter point has been strengthened by DeHaas and Pa-
ha (2016) who have shown that this result continues to hold under a wider
range of conditions. One of the most comprehensive approaches has been
provided by Azar (2017). In his model, agents include consumers, workers,
and shareholders, where the formers are also shareholders. Firms are run by
managers whose objective is to maximize approval votes for new strategic
plans. Due to this unusual assumption, it is hard to compare the results to
the traditional models on that topic. Antón et al. (2018) have set up a model
of product market competition with owners and managers. In contrast to our
model, however, they assume that the performance-dependent payments in
in the same sample of rms. In contrast, 'cross holdings' means that rm i holds some
shares of rm j and vice versa. In case of common holdings, in addition to the institutional
investors, there are usually 'minority shareholders' without any control on the respective
rms' decisions.
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the compensation schemes are restricted to the uncertain rm prots only.
Thus, there is no strategic distortion of manager incentives at work. Neverthe-
less, an increasing degree of common holdings induces less steep managerial
incentive schemes, thus leading to less intensive competition in the product
market.
Given the increasing importance of equity funds, it is hardly surprising
that a growing empirical literature on the topic has emerged. A rst line of
research addresses the competition eects of substantial common holdings.
Referring to common ownership by a small set of institutional investors,
Azar et al. (2018) have tackled the question empirically by investigating the
U.S. airline market. They nd evidence for the hypothesis that commonly
held rms induce additional price premia in addition to what should be
expected, given the traditional Herndahl index of market concentration. The
results seem to be robust although they are being disputed to some extent
(see, e.g., O'Brian and Waehrer 2017 and Azar et al. 2017). He and Huang
(2017) present empirical evidence that cross-holdings foster explicit forms of
product market coordination such as joint ventures, strategic alliances and
intra-industry acquisitions. Using data from the U.S. banking market, Azar
et al. (2016) have developed a generalized Herndahl concentration measure
by accounting for common holdings as well as cross holdings and are able to
show that both types of holdings induce softer competition.
A second line of empirical research is concerned with the corporate go-
vernance implications of institutional investors. McCahery et al. (2016) have
presented a survey on the role of institutional investors in corporate governan-
ce. One of their main ndings is that the decisive triggers for interventions
from institutional investors are governance and strategy. This is the issue
we deeply want to emphasize with our study. Cvijanovic et al. (2016) ha-
ve found that mutual funds regularly support management proposals except
for compensation proposals. Even though these papers highlight the level of
compensation rather than its structure, the idea that mutual funds intervene
in management compensation and strategic aspects strongly supports the
relevance of our research question.
Finally, our topic has direct consequences for antitrust authorities and
competition law. Recently, the German Monopolies Commission has expres-
sed concerns about competition-reducing eects of increasing cross holdings
induced by institutional investors (see Monopolkommission 2016, note S24).
In the U.S., several legal scholars have debated necessary amendments to
antitrust law. Posner et al. (2017) suggest a limitation of institutional inves-
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tors' ownership to either not more than 1% of the total size of an industry
or only one single rm per industry. Funds committing to strict passivity
should be excepted from this rule. Elhauge (2016) pleads instead for a stric-
ter case-by-case analysis on the basis of the current law. Baker (2016) ques-
tions the operability of the latter proposal. Lambert and Sykuta (2018, 2)
come to the conclusion: "The prevailing view among the antitrust elite thus
seems to be (1) that common holdings by institutional investors signicantly
diminish competition in oligopolistic industries, and (2) that additional anti-
trust intervention is appropriate to prevent competitive harm. ... We believe
that even if competition were softened by institutional investors' common
ownership of small minority interests in competing rms, the unintended ne-
gative consequences of an antitrust x would outweigh any benets from such
intervention."
To investigate the eects of common holdings and shareholder coordina-
tion on managerial incentives and hence product market competition in a
satisfying but still tractable way, we extend the basic management compen-
sation model in several directions. First, to allow for a more complex market
structure, we consider the case of a triopoly instead of the much simpler case
of a duopoly. This enables us to study an ownership structure where two
rms are commonly owned by coordinating shareholders while the sharehol-
ders of the third rm are not involved in that coordination. Second, to take
into account the empirical evidence that major stock indices consist of the
biggest rms, we introduce asymmetric unit costs of the rms as the source
of asymmetric rm sizes. Such an extension to asymmetric rm structures is
interesting in its own right. Furthermore, it enables us to analyze a scenario
where the index funds coordinate the behavior of the two bigger index rms
while the smaller, outside rm is not part of the index. Third, in case of a
homogeneous market, coordinating shareholders would take a less ecient
rm out of the market. To exclude this possibility, we consider a heteroge-
neous market. To sum up, we deal with a heterogeneous triopoly market,
where the output decisions are delegated to managers who are compensated
by optimized contracts and who have to run rms of dierent sizes.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the basic
assumptions and the structure of the model. As a benchmark case, Section 3
studies the model with common holdings but without coordination of share-
holders. Section 4 extends the analysis to the case of coordination by index
fund shareholders and compares the results to the basic scenario. Section 5
summarizes the main results and concludes the paper.
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2 Assumptions and the Structure of the Model
In order to study more complex ownership structures, we consider a pro-
duct market with three rms i = 1; 2; 3, each producing a substitute good.
Since almost all real markets are characterized by an intermediate degree of
product dierentiation, we assume that the market is heterogeneous and the
preferences of consumers with mass 1 can be captured by the quasi-linear
quadratic utility function
U = q0 + (q1 + q2 + q3)  (q21 + q22 + q23 + q1q2 + q1q3 + q2q3);  > 0 ;
(1)
where qi; i = 1; 2; 3; are the quantities of the dierentiated products sup-
plied by the three rms and q0 > 0 is the quantity of the numéraire good.
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Substituting q0 from the budget constraint I = q0+p1q1+p2q2+p3q3 and ma-
ximizing the utility function with respect to the quantities gives the inverse
demand system
pi =  Q  qi ; i = 1; 2; 3 ; (2)
where Q  q1 + q2 + q3 is the quantity produced by the rms altogether.
To allow for dierent rm sizes, which will prove to be important in the
case of common shareholders, we assume constant but dierent unit costs ci
of the rms. In order to keep the model tractable, we follow Barros (1998)
in assuming equal dierences in the unit costs such that
ci =
8<:
c   for i = 1
c for i = 2
c+  for i = 3 ;
where   0 indicates the degree of asymmetry. To guarantee that all rms
realize nonnegative prots in the triopoly market, we have to assume that
the unit cost dierences are not too large and restrict them to the interval
2This is a special case of the quasi-linear quadratic utility function U = q0 + (q1 +
q2 + q3)   (1=2)[(q21 + q22 + q23) + 2(q1q2 + q1q3 + q2q3)]; 0    , where  = 2 and
 = 1 indicate intermediate heterogeneity. The limit case of a homogeneous market would
be characterized by  = , the opposite limit case of three separated monopoly markets
would be captured by  = 0.
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0  =  13=28  0:4643 where      c is an appropriate measure of
market size. This leads to the rms' gross prots
i =
8<:
(+   Q  q1)q1 for i = 1
( Q  q2)q2 for i = 2
(    Q  q3)q3 for i = 3 ;
(3)
depending on the basic market conditions , c, and . Managers are awar-
ded according to the contracts oered by the owners. We follow Fershtman
and Judd (1987, 2006) and assume simple contracts implying the linear pay-
ments
si = fi + bi i ; i = 1; 2; 3 :
fi denotes the xed salary for the manager of rm i, bi > 0 serves as a
weight parameter which, in combination with fi, guarantees that the total
payments si to each manager are equal to a given market-specic payment
s.  i = (1  ^i)i+ ^ipiqi; i = 1; 2; 3; is the performance-dependent payment
as a weighted sum of the performance measures prot i and revenue piqi.
This specication leads to the managers' objective functions  i = i+ ^iciqi,
where ^i is the strategic contract parameter set by the owner of rm i. For
convenience we dene the transformed strategic parameters i  ^ici to
obtain the performance-dependent manager payments
 i =
8<:
(+  + 1  Q  q1)q1 for i = 1
(+ 2  Q  q2)q2 for i = 2
(   + 3  Q  q3)q3 for i = 3 :
(4)
Manager delegation is modeled as a strategic two-stage game, where ow-
ners simultaneously write observable compensation contracts with the stra-
tegic variables i in the rst stage and managers simultaneously choose pro-
duction quantities qi in the second stage.
3 While owners aim to maximize the
rm prots (3), the managers aim to maximize the performance-dependent
payments (4).
3Quantity competition can be regarded as a reduced form of competition by capacity
choice with subsequent price competition, as in Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) for the case
of homogeneous markets and in Maggi (1996) for the generalized case of heterogeneous
markets.
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3 Common Holdings without Owner Coordina-
tion
As a benchmark, we start our analysis by considering the case of manager
delegation without owner coordination. In the second stage of the game, the
managers decide on quantities qi, given the (transformed) contract parame-
ters i. The maximization of (4) with respect to the quantities leads to a
system of three linear rst-order conditions which can be solved in terms of
the quantities
qi =
8<:
(3+ 6 + 51   2   3)=18 for i = 1
(3  1 + 52   3)=18 for i = 2
(3  6   1   2 + 53)=18 for i = 3 :
(5)
These quantities imply the gross prot functions of the rms
i =
8<:
(6+ 12   81   22   23)(3+ 6 + 51   2   3)=324 for i = 1
(6  21   82   23)(3  1 + 52   3)=324 for i = 2
(6  12   21   22   83)(3  6   1   2 + 53)=324 for i = 3 :
(6)
In the rst stage of the game, since managers' total payment si = s
is xed, the rm owners maximize the prot functions (6) with respect to
the contract parameters i. In the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, the
rst-order conditions consist of the system of linear reaction functions
1 =(3+ 6   2   3)=40 ; (7)
2 =(3  1   3)=40 ;
3 =(3  6   1   2)=40 ;
which can be solved in terms of the strategic owner decisions
i =
8<:
(13+ 28)=182 for i = 1
13=182 for i = 2
(13  28)=182 for i = 3 :
(8)
Obviously, these contract parameters indicate biased compensation sche-
mes.4 Given these compensation contracts, managers choose the production
4According to the basic taxonomy of business strategies (see, e.g., Tirole 1988, Chapter
8), this represents an example of an aggressive top-dog strategy of the owners.
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quantities
qi =
8<:
(65+ 140)=364 for i = 1
65=364 for i = 2
(65  140)=364 for i = 3 ;
(9)
which lead to the gross rm prots
i =
8<:
(104+ 224)(65+ 140)=3642 for i = 1
67602=3642 for i = 2
(104  224)(65  140)=3642 for i = 3 :
(10)
Comparative statics show that the quantities and prots are increasing
in the market size  =   c. The degree of cost asymmetry  has a positive
impact on the quantities and prots of the most ecient rm 1 and a negative
impact on the quantities and prots of the least ecient rm 3, whereas there
is no inuence on the performance of rm 2.
The welfare in the market is dened as the sum of the producer surplus
 = 1 + 

2 + 

3 = (20; 280
2 + 62; 7202)=3642
and the consumer surplus CS = U q0 p1q1 p2q2 p3q3. Given the utility
function (1) and the inverse demand functions (2), we obtain the consumer
surplus
CS =q21 + q
2
2 + q
2
3 + q1q2 + q1q3 + q2q3
=(25; 3502 + 19; 6002)=3642 ;
so that the welfare adds up to
W  =  + CS = (45; 6302 + 82; 3202)=3642 :
Both measures are increasing in the market size  and the degree of cost
asymmetry .
4 Common Holdings and Owner Coordination
In order to capture the inuence of a coordinated owner behavior, we assume
that the bigger rms 1 and 2 are owned by index fund shareholders. This
implies that these owners have an incentive to cooperate in specifying their
managers' contracts while the managers compete in quantities as before.
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4.1 Manager Compensation with Owner Coordination
The index fund shareholders of the rms 1 and 2 maximize their common
prot 1+2 in (6) with respect to the contract variables 1 and 2 while the
owners of rm 3 maximize the prot 3 in (6) as before. The corresponding
rst-order conditions consist of the system of reaction functions5
1 =( 3+ 6   22 + 3)=38 ;
2 =( 3  12   21 + 3)=38 ;
3 =(3  6   1   2)=40 ;
which are solved in terms of the subgame perfect contract variables
i =
8<:
( 26+ 61)=356 for i = 1
( 26  117)=356 for i = 2
(28  52)=356 for i = 3 ;
(11)
implying the managers' quantity decisions
qi =
8<:
(52+ 145)=356 for i = 1
(52  33)=356 for i = 2
(70  130)=356 for i = 3
(12)
and the rm prots
i =
8<:
(130+ 229)(52+ 145)=3562 for i = 1
(130+ 51)(52  33)=3562 for i = 2
(112  208)(70  130)=3562 for i = 3 :
(13)
The consumer surplus is
CS = (20; 2922   6; 408 + 23; 0592)=3562 ;
the welfare amounts to
W  = (41; 6522   6; 408 + 81; 6212)=3562 :
In addition to the number of rms and the degree of heterogeneity, which
are given in our model, there are two decisive explanatory factors determining
5Remarkably, while the contract parameters generally are strategic substitutes, they
prove to be strategic complements in the relation between each inside rm and the outside
rm.
10
rm behavior and performance: the rst is the ownership structure leading
to a (partial) coordination in the design of the compensation contracts, the
second is the rms' unit cost asymmetry. To separate these two determi-
nants, we will rst discuss the results for identical unit costs, i.e.  = 0, in
order to identify the strategic eects in isolation. Afterwards, we will ana-
lyze the overall results by additionally taking into account the technological
asymmetry. The results are summarized in Table 1.
Table 1: Equilibrium results of the compensation game
without coordination (*) with coordination (**)
1= 0.0714 + 0.1538 (=) -0.0730 + 0.1713 (=)
2= 0.0714 -0.0730 - 0.3287 (=)
3= 0.0714 - 0.1538 (=) 0.0787 - 0.1461 (=)
q1= 0.1786 + 0.3846 (=) 0.1461 + 0.4073 (=)
q2= 0.1786 0.1461 - 0.0927 (=)
q3= 0.1786 - 0.3846 (=) 0.1966 - 0.3652 (=)
Q= 0.5357 0.4888 - 0.0506 (=)
CS=2 0.1913 + 0.1479 (=)2 0.1601 - 0.0506 (=) +0.1819 (=)2
1=
2 0.0510 + 0.2198 (=) + 0.2367 (=)2 0.0533 + 0.2427 (=) + 0.2620 (=)2
2=
2 0.0510 0.0533 - 0.0129 (=) - 0.0133 (=)2
3=
2 0.0510 - 0.2198 (=) + 0.2367 (=)2 0.0619 - 0.2298 (=) + 0.2133 (=)2
=2 0.1531 + 0.4734 (=)2 0.1685 + 0.4621 (=)2
W=2 0.3444 + 0.6213 (=)2 0.3287 - 0.0506 (=) + 0.6440 (=)2
4.2 Shareholder Coordination with Symmetric Firms
Let us start with the case of symmetric rms, i.e.  = 0. Whenever we refer
to numerical values, we normalize the market size variable  =   c to one
without loss of generality. Indeed, as can be seen from Table 1, the results
continue to qualitatively hold for all values  > 0.
The coordination between index fund shareholders leads to less intensive
competition between the rms because the strategic eects of manager com-
pensation are mitigated when they are internalized by the coordinated rms.
The coordinating shareholders now choose an inoensive puppy-dog strategy
in designing the compensation contracts (1 = 

2 =  0:0730 < 1 = 2 =
11
0:0714), whereas the shareholders of the outside rm choose an even more
aggressive top-dog strategy (3 = 0:0787 > 

3 = 0:0714).
The modied incentive structure induces managers to reallocate produc-
tion. The quantities of the coordinated rms decrease from q1 = q

2 = 0:1786
to q1 = q

2 = 0:1461, while the quantity of rm 3 increases from q

3 = 0:1786
to q3 = 0:1966. The overall quantity Q is decreasing (Q =  0:0469), im-
plying that the coordination leads to softer competition and higher overall
prots ( = 0:0154). The prot gains, however, are asymmetrically distri-
buted: the prots of the two coordinated rms only slightly increase from
1 = 

2 = 0:0510 to 

1 = 

2 = 0:0533, while the prot of the outside
rm 3 increases from 3 = 0:0510 to 

3 = 0:0619. Remarkably, the prot
gain of rm 3 even exceeds the joint prot gains of the coordinated rms.
This is a reminiscence of an important result which is well-known from the
merger literature: the merging rms slightly increase their prots while the
non-merging rms experience an even higher increase of their prots (see
Salant et al. 1983).
Evidently, the decline of the trade volume reduces the consumer surplus
(from CS = 0:1913 to CS = 0:1601) as well as the welfare (from W  =
0:3444 to W  = 0:3287) in the market.
4.3 Shareholder Coordination with Asymmetric Firms
The coordination eects of index fund shareholders become more interesting
when we additionally allow for cost dierences between rms ( > 0). Since
index fund shareholders are typically invested in the bigger index rms (here
rms 1 and 2), we assume that the outside rm (rm 3) is the smallest one.
The technological asymmetry oers a further option for a reallocation of
production between the coordinated rms. Of course, production quantities
and rm prots can be moved from the less ecient rm 2 to the most
ecient rm 1. Table 1 summarizes the results in terms of the market size
parameter  > 0 and the parameter 0    (13=28)  0:4643 which
measures the size of cost asymmetry.
A comparison of the strategic decisions on the contract designs shows
that the inequalities
1 < 

1; 

2 < 

2; 

3 > 

3
continue to hold true. However, the technological dierences induce the
index fund shareholders to design compensation contracts, providing the ma-
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nager of the most ecient rm 1 with an incentive to act more aggressively
and the manager of the less ecient rm 2 to act even more inoensive.
The consequence is that some production is moved from rm 2 to rm 1. A
comparison of the managers' quantity decisions showes that the relations
q1 < q

1; q

2 < q

2; q

3 > q

3; Q
 < Q
generally hold. For all feasible -values, the prot relations prove to be
1 > 

1; 

2 ? 2 for (=) 7 0:1539; 3 > 3 :
Of course, an implication of the reallocation of production is that the
protability of rm 1 further increases. The low prot of the least ecient
outside rm 3 still increases as a consequence of shareholder coordination.
The overall coordination eect on the prot of rm 2 can be positive or ne-
gative, depending on the size of cost dierences. In case of small unit cost
dierences, (=)  0:1539, its prot goes up due to the less aggressive beha-
vior of both coordinated rms. However, in case of large unit cost dierences,
(=) > 0:1539, the coordination of the index fund shareholders drives its
prot down.
This result reects a basic conict between institutional investors invested
in rms 1 and 2 and minority shareholders being solely invested in rm 2.
Of course, the minority shareholders of rm 2 are not interested in shifting
quantities to rm 1. The relevance of this eect is further strengthened by
the fact that institutional investors usually act in a well organized manner
while small investors often prefer not to participate in general meetings.
Finally, it generally holds for all feasible -values that CS < CS and
W  < W , i.e., shareholder cooperation reduces the consumer surplus as
well as the welfare in the market. While rms benet from a less aggressive
compensation scheme, consumers suer from a loss of surplus due to share-
holder coordination. The reduction in welfare is less severe when there are
cost dierences. Accordingly, the increase of overall prots declines with in-
creasing cost dierences. Since the latter eect is stronger than the former
one, the reduction in welfare increases in the cost dierences.
5 Summary and Conclusion
In many markets, bigger rms are to a considerable extent commonly owned
by institutional investors like index funds while smaller rms are owned by
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independent shareholders. Given such a common-holding ownership structu-
re, the index funds have an incentive to coordinate in designing their manager
compensation schemes.
This paper studied the consequences of such a coordination by analyzing
an asymmetric triopoly where the two biggest rms are owned by an index
fund and the smallest rm by independent shareholders. We showed that this
type of collusion leads to compensation contracts which make the managers
less aggressive such that the rms involved in the coordination reduce their
production while the outside rm increases its output. This reallocation of
production induces a redistribution of the prots: the outside rm and the
most ecient rm owned by the index funds gain from the coordination while
the less ecient rm owned by the index funds might suer from a loss of
prots when the cost dierences are large.
The total output in the market is reduced such that shareholder coor-
dination is detrimental to consumer surplus as well as welfare. Therefore,
the neglect of index funds in previous models of strategic manager compen-
sation may lead to serious shortcomings of the theory. Our results conrm
the concerns about coordination activities of index funds with common hol-
dings. This coordination behavior induces crucial implications with respect
to reduced competition and redistributed rm prots in the product markets.
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